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ABSTRACT 
Aid coordination is in a constant theme of discussion among national and 
international aid agencies in their search for more effectiveness and efficiency 
in delivering development assistance. Not only at the international scope but 
also at the national and regional scales, coordination always seems to be 
cumbersome when it comes to donations and charity issues. In this study it is 
tried to sketch out literature in the domain of international aid and with a 
solution finding of both theoretical and conceptual approaches to the 
problems that hinder coordination amongst donors and aid agencies are laid 
out to be analyzed and scrutinized. One of the main arguments is that lack of 
coordination not only does spoil market resilience in the recipient country but 
also hamper ecosystem and investment climate that make poor countries more 
and more aid-dependent. It is concluded that the stakeholders of donors and 
funding institutions have their own agendas in which coordination with 
other donors does not seem to be a priority. 
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BAĞIŞ SAHİPLERİNİN YARDIM İLKELERİ VE 
YÖNTEMLERİ ÜZERİNDEN İNSANİ YARDIM 
KONULARININ BAĞIMLILIK VE KALKINMA SONRASI 
TEORİLERİYLE SORUN ANALİZİ 
ÖZ 
Yardım koordinasyonu, ulusal ve uluslararası yardım kuruluşları arasında, 
kalkınma yardımlarının sağlanmasında daha fazla etkinlik ve verimlilik 
arayışında olan sürekli bir tartışma konusudur. Bağış ve hayır işlerinde 
sadece uluslararası kapsamda değil, ulusal ve bölgesel ölçeklerde de, 
koordinasyon her zaman zahmetli görünmektedir. Bu çalışmada, uluslararası 
yardımlar alanında literatürün taslak haline getirilmesi ve vericiler arasında 
koordinasyonu engelleyen sorunlara hem teorik hem de kavramsal 
yaklaşımların çözümünde çözüm bulunmaya çalışılmış ve yardım 
kuruluşları analiz edilerek incelenmiştir. Temel argümanlardan biri, 
koordinasyon eksikliğinin sadece alıcı ülkede pazar esnekliğini bozmakla 
kalmayıp aynı zamanda yoksul ülkelere daha fazla yardım bağımlı hale 
getiren ekosistem ve yatırım ortamını da engellemesidir. Bağışçı ve fon veren 
kurumların paydaşlarının, diğer bağışçılarla koordinasyonun öncelikli 
olmadığı birtakım özel gündemleri olduğu sonucuna varılmıştır. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: İnsani Yardım, Uluslararası Örgütler, Kamu 
Yardım Yönetimi, Yardım Bağımlılık, Koordinasyonsuzluk. 
Jel Kodu: F35, F54, F55, L31 
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According to the United Nations World Food Program, one in seven 
people go to bed hungry every night. In fact, hunger kills more people 
than HIV/ AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis combined. In addition, 
some 884 million people do not have access to clean drinking water, of 
these, 468 million live in Asia, and 328 million live in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Furthermore, in excess of 1 billion people make a three to 
seven-hour journey on foot just to collect water, the weight of it 
carried on their heads is commonly 20kg, and these journeys are often 
dangerous1. 
Economic growth is necessary but not enough to accelerate reduction 
of hunger and malnutrition. It costs on average just US 25 cents a day 
to feed a hungry child and change her life forever. While food is the 
most basic of human needs required for survival, on average, 1 in 8 
people go to bed hungry each night. Hunger kills, maims, reduces IQ, 
lowers wages, reduces school attendance and undermines economic 
growth (Murphy, 2013: 58). 
Recent evidence demonstrates that aid is effective in raising economic 
growth and reducing income poverty in good ecosystems, but 
ineffective in poor ecosystems. Therefore ecosystem, market 
conditions, investment climate, environmental health and security 
competency and considerations are of crucial importance. All these 
parameters are requirements of building an independent state and 
public order. The result holds both when the environment is defined 
narrowly as fiscal, monetary, and trade policies and more broadly in 
terms of wide range of policies and public institutions (Burnside, 2000: 
23). 
Evidence also shows that the policy and institutional ecosystem of the 
recipient country has only a limited impact on the present allocation 
of aid. It is because donors have multiple objectives for their aid, such 
as strategic and historical considerations, the actual allocation of aid 
differs significantly from the poverty-efficient allocation that would 
target poor countries with good policies and institutions. According to 
1 For more information, see: WFP FAQs, www.wfp.org and 
http://www.fao.org/hunger/en/  










one calculation, the present allocation of aid lifts 10 million people out 
of poverty annually, while poverty-efficient allocation would double 
the effect of aid on growth and poverty (Ibid.). 
Therefore, aid effectiveness could be much enhanced if donors 
improved their allocation of aid between recipient countries towards 
those that are poorer and have good policies and institutions. That is 
also a contradiction. That poorest ones do not have both effective 
institutional structure and human resources to handle problems 
makes them more aid-dependent. Great emphasis has recently been 
paid on harmonizing the donor practices to reduce the transaction 
costs for distribution of aid effectively. International aid organization 
and their operation costs are the transaction costs for global 
community. 
As is seen in the figure 1, The Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality 
and Accountability (CHS) sets out Nine Commitments that 
organizations and individuals involved in humanitarian response can 
use to improve the quality and effectiveness of the assistance they 
provide. It also facilitates greater accountability to communities and 
people affected by crisis: knowing what humanitarian organizations 
have committed to will enable them to hold those organizations to be 
accountable. 
Figure 1. The Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and 
Accountability (CHS) 
 
Source: Core Humanitarian Standard (Anonim, 2015) 
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Here lack of coordination, improper information, digital divide, 
inappropriate usage of funds and mismanagement in recipient 
countries are main hindrances for effective use of funds for the cause 
of fighting against hunger and malnutrition related conditions. A 
comprehensive literature review is being conducted and their 
discussions and main findings are skimmed for a better 
understanding of management and governance of aid organizations.  
1. RESEARCH PROBLEM AND THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
Our study tries to provide answers and solutions for aid dependency 
and malfunctioning ecosystem of poor countries via continuous and 
frequent foreign aid mechanisms that are being functioned by diverse 
aid agencies. While extensive researches lay down in the domain of 
foreign aid, we have found aid dependency as our research problem. 
Expectations of continuous consumer demand and conduct of 
different business are focal points for economic activities with which 
employment, tax revenue and investments trigger engine of business. 
Certain market conditions and an ecosystem that feed entrepreneurs 
and attract new investments are being blocked by foreign aid.  
According to Ross (Ross, 2007) and Poppendieck (Poppendieck, 1997) 
hunger is something which, it can be argued, is universal in human 
nature and experience, and universally regarded as something which 
can be changed with the provision of proper food. However, as Shaw 
(Shaw D. J., 2001, s. 33) argued that politics starts to intrude if, rather 
than just getting food to the hungry, questions are raised about why 
people lack access to enough food. 
As defined by Barrett, Maxwell (Barrett, Maxwell, 2005: 105) that the 
US is yet to shift from in-kind to monetary donations to the WFP, 
though almost all other donors have done so, is consistent with this 
argument concerning differences between international regime and 
domestic US feed-the-hungry norms. For example, as it is pointed out 
by Clay (Clay, 2003: 704) that shifting from in-kind to monetary 
donation has also been associated with an overall reduction in the 
value of donations, and the WFP is concerned with the trade-offs 











It is argued by Easterly (Easterly, 2006: 75) that a vast amount of 
money has been spent on foreign aid, especially in Africa, and that 
national growth rates have not increased as a result of the aid. There is 
a shadow currently hanging over the field of international aid that has 
been a waste of money and has even done more harm than good, 
spoiling their market and ecosystem. Mayo (Mayo, 2009) claimed that 
aid to Africa has only increased poverty, deepened dependence to aid 
given by the West, and institutionalized corruption in government.  
Collier (Collier P., 2007: 86) takes a more analytical approach to the 
situations that retard economic growth. Ian (Smillie, 2009) presents a 
striking example of how indigenous non-governmental organizations 
can be highly effective in the struggle against poverty and hunger. 
Figure 2. Exaggerative Aid Dependency Problem 
 
Source: Cartoon Movement (Matumula, 2016) 
In a report of GAO (GAO, 2015) it is defined that USAID cannot 
systematically measure the performance of food-for-assets activities 
across all development projects and therefore cannot determine the 
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effectiveness of food-for-assets activities in achieving short-term or 
longer-term development goals.  
As is stressed by Bourguignon, Platteau (Bourguignon, Platteau, 2015: 
88) that the need for a proper evaluation of aid agencies is even more 
pressing as, side by side with serious agencies, there exist careless 
organizations that are not equipped with proper monitoring and 
sanctioning mechanisms to assess desired results and planned 
achievements. They tend to disburse funds quickly either because 
they do not have a good understanding of the game or are not single-
mindedly pursuing the objective of poverty alleviation or they are 
being involved in agendas that does not ail recipients. The second 
problem arises when, despite all their pro-poor rhetoric, aid 
organizations are concerned with reproducing themselves as job- and 
income-providers for their employees.  
It is analyzed by Halonen-Akatwijuka (Halonen-Akatwijuka, 2005) 
the allocation of foreign aid to different sectors in a recipient 
developing country. It is found that donors tend to favor social sectors 
over other public expenditure programs. Coordination failure occurs 
due to incomplete information and lack of transparency and proper 
cooperation. It is recommended that the donors may concentrate too 
much on the priority sectors leaving the lower priority, yet important, 
sectors lacking funds. Alternatively, it is also recommended that there 
may be gaps in services in the priority areas because of the 
information problem. It is found that the more similar preferences the 
















Figure 3. Problematic Ecosystem of funding agencies with NGOs 
 
Source: Odessablog (Anonim, What to make of Decree 68/2016, 2016) 
Increase of food prices are also studied as part of problems of 
humanitarian aid. While food prices have declined slightly since 2008, 
they are found to be relatively high. It is argued that rich countries do 
better in terms of delivering food assistance to the world’s poorest 
people. In an article by Ramachandran, Leo, McCarthy 
(Ramachandran, Leo, McCarthy, 2013: 330), it is outlined ways in 
which donors can commit to feeding the poor and financial 
mechanisms that will enable more food to reach more people around 
the world. However, this becomes a major problem of humanitarian 
aid system when a country tends to be more aid dependent. 
Therefore, a review of changes in food assistance policies and 
practices is important for several reasons (Harvey, Proudlock, Clay, 
Riley, Jaspars, 2010). 
1. A shift from food aid to food assistance by key donors, UN agencies 
and NGOs is an important step.  In terms of assistance programming, 
significant trends include the shift from in-kind food aid to local and 
regional procurement, an increase in the use of cash transfers and an 
increasing role for social protection and hunger safety nets.  
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2.  Changes is required in the context in which food assistance is to be 
provided. The global food, finance and fuel crises and climate change, 
as well as the ever more protracted nature of some internal conflicts 
are all factors which are putting pressure on the international  
community for a change of focus in food assistance policy and 
practice.  
3. Changes in the international architecture and the delivery of food  
assistance would be a strategic move. The humanitarian reform 
agenda (the clusters, the CERF) and the future of the Food Aid 
Convention (FAC), currently in debate, are critical areas of change in 
the international humanitarian and food security architecture.   
2. THEORETICAL STRUCTURE 
Our study leans on theoretical assumptions and hypothesis of the 
dependency theory and post-development theory. Dependency theory 
was developed by Raul Prebish (1950) and Cardoso and Faletto (1960) 
that tried to understand economic divergence between developed and 
underdeveloped world in a period of 200 years in the favor of western 
industrialized countries (Cardosso, Falleto, 1979). Main argument of 
dependency theory can be concisely explained that the dependent 
states supply cheap minerals, agricultural commodities, and cheap 
labor, and serve as the repositories of surplus capital, obsolescent 
technologies, and manufactured goods. These functions orient the 
economies of the dependent states toward the outside: money, goods, 
and services do flow into dependent states, but the allocation of these 
resources is determined by the economic interests of the dominant 
states, and not by the economic interests of the dependent state  
(Ferraro, 1996: 3). 
Later, dependency theory has turned out to be critics against 
modernization theory and state building policies of western countries. 
Therefore, the no classical theory of development became main target 
for dependency theory. This tendency has been reached its cusp by 
post-development theory of postmodern school that seeks to find 
alternatives to development theory. Post development theory argued 
that the rich countries cannot lift the poor countries out of poverty 
vicious cycle. Regional and local communities need to be empowered 










Therefore, development countries should not follow moral and 
cultural guidance of aid donors that relying on ill-suited ideas from 
overseas.  
According to Sayigh (Sayigh, 1991: 41-45), the critique of the 
modernization theory by dependency advocates focused on three 
central points.  
1. Modernization was viewed by its theorists as an evolutionary, 
transitional process which moved nonlinearity, thus transforming 
societies from traditionalism to modernity in stages. Therefore, the 
periphery needs to adapt to policies and institutional requirements 
of central western countries.  
2. Modernization meant the adoption essentially of one ideal western 
model that had universal and humanitarian value and 
applicability. Third world must use own resources to come closer 
to a western modern country.   
3. Several pattern variables like the traits or features of modernity 
versus traditionalism were identified and assigned a central 
function in causing underdevelopment, or in being instrumental in 
leading to development. Cultural convergence to western values 
and capitalist tradition became symbols of wealthy state.  
According to Ateş and others (Ateş, Es, Bayraktar, 2005), today, by the 
aid of globalization, the capitalist world order sets the agenda for 
investments almost all over the world. If the investments in poor 
countries are on low level, and the trade deficit threatens the 
countries’ financial resources, the dependence on aid and on 
borrowed funds seems crucial. The developed countries have always 
opposed change in the structure of power allocation in the 
international economic order, basically because of their benefits of 
today’s status quo. It is because that their ecosystem spoiled from 
early colonial age in which their natural resources brutally stolen and 
their human capital taken as the slaves that were used in capital 
accumulation and building western modern states. In the post-
colonial period, the former colonial powers made the use of people 
that could take care of their interests in the country. Therefore, 
dependence of the developing countries on developed countries 
should be attributed to external and internal factors that led to 
insufficient internal dynamics. 
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3. MAIN ORGANIZATIONS AND DONORS IN THE AREA 
International aid is being delivered by various foundations that try to 
provide basic needs to poor countries that are guided towards 
building a western style modern state. Key players are first donors 
then the multinational organizations that are operating in the field of 
aid, relief and development of poor nations. Here is a list of 532 
international, multinational organizations and NGOs collected from 
various internet resources: 
1. Action Against Hunger (AAH) 
2. African Development Bank (AfDB) 
3. Development Bank of Latin America (CAF) 
4. Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
5. CARE 
6. Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) 
7. Caritas Internationalis 
8. Catholic Relief Services (CRS - USCC)  
9. Colombo Plan (CP) 
10. Doctors Without Borders 
11. Emergency Nutrition Network (ENN) 
12. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
13. European Investment Bank 
14. Food For The Hungry International (FHI) 
15. Hunger Plus, Inc 
16. Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) 
17. Interaction 
18. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD; 
part of the World Bank Group) 
19. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
20. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 
(IFRC) 
21. International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) 
22. International Labour Organization (ILO) 
2  In addition to those given above, there are a few hundreds of 
organizations that are working in the aid field. For more information see: 
 http://reliefweb.int/organizations and also 
https://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=search.results&cgid=7
&cuid=20  










23. International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
24. International Organization for Migration (IOM) 
25. International Red Cross (ICRC AND IFRC) 
26. International Rescue Committee (IRC) 
27. Islamic Development Bank (IDB) 
28. Lutheran World Federation 
29. Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) 
30. Mercy Corps (MC) 
31. Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA, part of the 
World Bank Group) 
32. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) 
33. Overseas Development Institute (ODI) 
34. Refugees International 
35. Relief International 
36. Save the Children 
37. Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation ACP-EU 
(CTA) 
38. The Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) 
39. United Nations (UN) 
40. United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) 
41. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) 
42. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
43. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA) 
44. United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) 
45. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
46. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
47. United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) 
48. US Committee for Refugees (USCR) 
49. World Bank Group 
50. World Food Programme (WFP) 
51. World Health Organization (WHO) 
52. World Trade Organization (WTO) 
53. World Vision International 
Among the new ingredients of international relations since the Second 
World War—nuclear warfare, space research, race relations and 
development—none is in greater need of expert signposting than 
international aid. As an example, by Stevens (Stevens, 1966) amongst 
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some studies of similar concern has concentrated on creating better 
public understanding of the reasons why rich countries should aid 
poor ones; and critically to analyzing the process of aid-giving in both 
economic and political terms for the benefit of policy-makers and 
practitioners. 
An article by Ross (Ross, 2007: 270) sought to analyze the normative 
and political characteristics of the WFP which have contributed to its 
effectiveness. Among its most significant findings is that American 
agricultural interests, interpreted through the prism of domestic 
political norms, have dovetailed with ‘feed-the-hungry’ norms that 
are projected and implemented by the WFP, resulting in the strong 
support of the United States for the WFP. This huge amount of 
support underlines the perception, promoted by some critics, that the 
UN is somehow incapable of acting in ways that are incompatible 
with the national interests of the United States and other significant 
member-states who inherently pursue ‘national interests’in 
institutional environments. 
As illustrated at the Table 2, due to their economic wellbeing majority 
of total aid given is always provided by developed countries. USA is 
always found at the top just above EU countries as it seen in the table 


















Table 1. Contributions to WFP: Comparative Figures and Five-Year 
Aggregate Ranking 
 
Source: WFP (WFP, Contributions to WFP: Comparative Figures and Five-Year 
Aggregate Ranking, 2018) 
As the above table shows the amount of aid paid by donors to WFP, 
the table in below shows total amount given by donors to all aid 
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Table 2. The Biggest Global Humanitarian Contributions in 2018: 
Totals by donor 
 
Source: Derived from UNOCHA (Anonim, UNOCHA, 2018) 
As expressed by Stevens (Stevens, 1966: 645) it is clear that there is 
great need for better co-ordination between Western donors, which in 
effect means only the five major ones—the United States, the United 
Kingdom, France, Germany and I.B.R.D (with associates).  
Considering the amount that are being given by big boys’ 
interventions to the aid organizations in order for their products and 
services be sold and their companies regain advantages from the 
recipient countries they will not remain idle. This makes a point why 
aid organizations do not collaborate and lack in cooperation. It is 
because nearly every western country has created some aid 
organizations that are serving mainly for the cause of prosperity of 
their ecosystem that needs roots from dependable countries 
alleviation capital inflow.  
As it is be argued Spector, Wagner (Spector, Wagner, 2013: 329) that 
the donor countries usually want something from their assistance 
which is the main motivation behind aid organizations. Certainly, 
there are self-interested reasons for providing assistance as well: 
gaining access to a country’s resources, attracting the recipient into 










political opposition if the donor seeks regime change, among many 
others. 
4. PROBLEMS FACED DUE TO LACK OF COORDINATION 
AND PROPER INFORMATION SHARING 
Coordination of humanitarian aid is a difficult process. Organizations 
come into coordination structures voluntarily, but they have different, 
occasionally contradictory mandates. Inevitable differentiations in 
approach, methodology, perspective, and donor priorities reflect the 
diversity of the humanitarian community. Should there be a proper 
ERP system that all the aid agencies are included for management and 
governance of aid coordination, then it would be easier for agencies to 
have better cooperation and information sharing. WFP seems to be far 
ahead of aid agencies in using ICT infrastructure. 
In an interviewed by Mari (Mari, 2013) with Jakob Kern, CIO of WPF 
of the time, it is stressed that the very need of aid organization is to 
have an ERP system that includes the much-updated information 
regarding real needs of people. The next area of focus will be the 
implementation of an information governance mechanism, to serve as 
the foundation for a knowledge-sharing and collaboration platform. 
“We have our ERP system for core financial and human resources 
data, so there is no technical requirement in those areas – it is more 
about the governance and management of the operational data. We 
are putting in place a master data management framework and basic 
things that are common, such as ‘who owns geospatial data’ and ‘who 
owns procurement data’,” he adds. “This governance structure aims 
at determining who owns the data, so we can produce all the reports 
we provide to our donors.” Once the data owners are identified, they 
will determine the information format they require, where the data is 
stored and who has access to it. With that, Kern expects to stop the 
duplication of data. Until recently, IT leadership at WFP was 
presented as the sum of many elements such as salaries, licenses, 
hardware, software, contracts and data center costs. 
The Paris Declaration of 2005 outlined a strategy to make aid more 
efficient through the rationalization of donor behavior. In 2011 there 
was a high-level meeting in Busan, where participants agreed on the 
“Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation.” According to 
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Bingsten and Tengstam (Bigsten, Tengstam, 2015: 81) this is an 
attempt to adjust the aid architecture to the new realities with a more 
diverse body of donors. Four shared general principles are listed in 
the Busan Declaration which was signed by 109 countries 52 
international aid organizations3 :  
1. Ownership of development priorities by developing countries: Countries 
should define the development model that they want to 
implement.  
2. Focus on results: Having a sustainable impact should be the driving 
force behind investments and efforts in development policy 
making. This principle emphasizes that learning from experiences 
and the importance of alignment of aid inflows with recipient 
priorities and policies. 
3. Inclusive development partnerships: Development depends on the 
participation of all actors and recognizes the diversity and 
complementarity of their functions. The desire to be inclusive and 
open for the new players meant that there is less emphasis on 
harmonization than in previous declarations. 
4. Transparency and accountability: If recipient governments cannot 
account for the resources that have been transferred to them, 
donors will not be willing to continue transferring resources. 
Development co-operation must be transparent and accountable to 
all citizens  
It is claimed by Bourguignon, Platteau (Bourguignon, Platteau, 2015: 
86) for donor countries, the main shortcoming of aid coordination is 
the loss of national sovereignty and the impeded ability to pursue 
national objectives through aid programs. For recipient countries, it is 
their diminished independence owing to reduced competition among 
donors. There is need to clarify some of the arguments in support of 
aid coordination in the light of the unavoidable trade-offs born of the 
existence of political costs of both donors and recipients. 
3  For more information see: 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/busanadherents.htm  










A. PROBLEMS RELATED WITH FIELD MONITORING 
Competency in field monitoring is one of the key elements of aid 
coordination. Every aid agency must set up a system of monitoring 
and control for aid operations, procurement, logistics, delivery and 
reporting. Usage of a collective or shared frameworks and systems in 
collaboration will inevitable decrease transaction costs and increase 
efficiency and effectiveness of aid allocation and distribution.  
As an example and best practice, a detailed organization-wide 
guidance for monitors is available in WFP’s Monitoring and 
Evaluation Guidelines and in WFP’s Program Guidance Manual, 
which includes guidance for conducting food distribution monitoring 
and post-distribution monitoring for emergency operations and relief 
activities.  
As is expressed in the report (GAO, USAID Should Systematically 
Assess the Effectiveness of Key Conditional Food Aid Activities , 
2015), WFP’s monitoring and evaluation guidance provides 
instructions for collecting field data, including discussions of 
sampling options, methods for choosing beneficiaries to interview, 
and instructions on collecting and processing qualitative data. In 
addition, WFP has developed numerous forms for food aid monitors 
to conduct on-site food distribution monitoring and post-distribution 
monitoring. WFP’s job profile for its monitors states that they are 
responsible for conducting continuous monitoring and reporting of 
food assistance, identifying potential problems, and periodically 
monitoring risk management and report on any actions taken. 
According to Audit reports (OIOS, 2006), WFP’s organization wide 
monitoring guidance does not provide clear instructions or guidelines 
stating that monitoring of warehouses and distribution sites should be 
based on risk, including risks to WFP’s ability to distribute food to 
intended beneficiaries. In 2006, the External Auditor recommended 
that WFP use statistical sampling approaches based on risk profiling 
and informed by implementing partner records, beneficiary concerns, 
and prior history, as a basis for focusing its monitoring resources. 
WFP’s organization-wide field monitoring guidance instructs 
monitors to follow up on issues based on prior field monitoring 
A Problem Analysis over Humanitarian Aid Issues Based on Aid Principles 
and Methodology of Donors Dependency and Post-Development Theories 
99 
 





findings and notes that risks, along with resources, budget and other 
factors should be captured in monitoring and evaluation plans. 
According to COSO which is an internal control standard referenced 
by the guidance, an effective approach to monitoring includes 
designing and executing monitoring procedures that are prioritized 
based on risks to achieving organizational objectives. However, 
according to Audit reports, the guidance does not clearly instruct 
WFP staff and field monitors to consider risk as a key factor when 
determining the level of monitoring needed at warehouses and 
distribution sites. In addition, the guidance does not include 
instructions for tailoring monitoring based on the types of risk 
identified, including contextual risks, such as armed conflict, and 
institutional risks that could affect WFP’s reputation. For example 
expressed in the report (GAO, USAID Should Systematically Assess 
the Effectiveness of Key Conditional Food Aid Activities , 2015), 
WFP’s organization-wide monitoring guidance does not address 
alternative approaches to ensuring monitoring of food assistance 
distribution sites in high-risk areas where the UN Department of 
Safety and Security (UNDSS) has restricted WFP staff’s access. 
Without specific guidance that monitoring should be risk-based, WFP 
staff lack appropriate instructions to develop monitoring plans for 
those areas that are most vulnerable to waste, fraud, and abuse (WPF, 
2006). 
B. PROBLEMS RELATED WITH ECOSYSTEM AND 
ENVIRONS OF AID RECIPIENTS 
A set of indicators to facilitate the identification of needs and obstacles 
follow below that also provides pertinent data regarding failures of 
humanitarian aid. Gini, GDP, Corruption indexes and development 
traps are considered as the key factors that can give clear picture of an 
ecosystem. 
(a) The Gini Index and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
The Gini Index measures income disparity among families within a 
country. A Gini coefficient of zero expresses perfect equality. Using 
income as an example, this would mean everyone made the same 
amount. On the opposite end of the spectrum, a Gini coefficient of one 










The trend of the US is not towards countries that have a good 
standard of justice and social equality. The trend of the US is towards 
countries that are known for social inequality, corruption, and what 
some might call banana republics (Anonim, gini vs gdp, 2007).  
Figure 4. GINI vs. GDP Index 
 
Source: CIA World Fact Sheets by Mindcontagion 
Tying GDP per capita to the Gini Index gives a clearer picture of how 
well off a country is and how the wealth is distributed. Here are four 
possible scenarios and a possible analysis and prescription for each by 
Keenan (Keenan, 2011): 
Low GI and low GDP: The country is uniformly poor. Therefore, 
widespread income generation strategies may be appropriate and are 
probably connected to the need for enhanced literacy, education and 
training. Quality of governance in both the public and private sectors 
will also likely need upgrading. Examples are several countries of the 
former Soviet Union, and Ethiopia. 
Low GI and high GDP: Most people are reasonably well off. This 
scenario is typical of EU countries, especially the Nordic countries, as 
well as South Korea and Australia, none of which is a candidate for 
international development assistance. 
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High GI and low GDP: Non-uniform poverty exists in the country. 
Several examples are in sub-Saharan Africa, such as the Central 
African Republic, Niger, Namibia and Lesotho, as well as Haiti. 
Income-generation strategies targeted to specific sectors may be 
appropriate and are probably connected to the need for enhanced 
education and training. However, there may be obstacles to 
development created by families, political parties or ethnic groups 
that hold economic power. Examples are Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe and 
some countries in Central and South America. 
High GI and high GDP: One possibility is that the entrepreneur class in 
the country has been successful in producing wealth. However, this 
wealth is not extensively shared with the rest of the population. 
Examples are Brazil, Chile, Singapore and Hong Kong. Another 
possibility is that, in resource-rich countries like Nigeria and 
Venezuela, there is a group with political power that is reluctant to 
share national wealth with the rest of the population. An absence of 
democratic institutions combined with narrowly held wealth suggests 
that corruption and the lack of transparency will be obstacles to 
development. 
(b) Corruption Perceptions Index and Bribe Payers Index 
Two helpful indicators created by the organization Transparency 
International (TI) are the Corruption Perceptions Index and the Bribe 
Payers Index. The CPI has a scale from 10 (highly clean) to 0 (highly 
corrupt). The TI Bribe Payers Index evaluates the supply side of 
corruption – the likelihood of firms from the world’s industrialized 
countries to bribe abroad. Belgium and Canada shared first place in 
the 2008 BPI with a score of 8.8 out of a very clean 10, indicating that 














Figure 5. Corruption Perception vs. Bribe Payers Index 
 
Source: Transprency International (Hardoon, 2011) 
The BPI also shows public works and construction companies to be 
the most corruption-prone when dealing with the public sector, and 
most likely to exert undue influence on the policies, decisions and 
practices of governments. Therefore, both indexes show degree of 
healthiness of an ecosystem. 
(c) Negligible Economic Growth and Development Traps 
According to Paul Collier, in his book The Bottom Billion, there are 
some 58 countries that do not experience economic growth even 
though they have received considerable amounts of aid and support 
over several years. These countries, is found to have been fallen into 
one or more “development traps,” labelled by Collier (Collier P. , 
2007) and detailed Keenan (Keenan, 2011) as follows: 
The Conflict Trap:  Coups and civil wars impose huge costs on a 
country. Relapses are likely because some warring participants learn 
how to profit from fighting. For most of the population, however, 
poverty is increased because of conflict, resulting in resentment and 
anger in young people, and leading them to more fighting. 
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The Natural Resource Trap: Countries that are rich in natural resources 
attract national, regional, and international groups eager to fight for 
control of the resources. Governments become wealthy and 
increasingly unresponsive to their citizens. Resource wealth 
discourages industrial development in the country.  
Landlocked with Bad Neighbors: It is very difficult for such countries to 
participate in international trade, especially if transportation 
infrastructure connections are poor. 
Bad Governance in a Small Country: International investors can be 
discouraged by countries with economies damaged by inept 
management, combined with the smallness of markets and labour 
pools. 
Figure 6. Trapping Factors Determining Poor Ecosystem 
 
Source: Coolgeography (Anonim, 2015) 
The above mentioned the conflict trap, the natural resource trap, 
landlocked with bad neighbors and bad governance in a small 
country are all sources of a vicious poverty cycle that hamper 
economic growth and development. In the Figure 6 it is illustrated 
how a poverty trap works. All of the elements are deteriorating the 
ecosystem which is the basis for efficiency, effectiveness and economy 
of public or international supports and indicator of direct investments, 










(c) Merciless Colonization that Crippled Ecosystem of 
Underdeveloped Nations 
Since the time of wild capitalization era in which the western 
countries transferred natural resources and exploited human 
resources of colonies of the time that are now underdeveloped 
countries. Those acts of civilizations are considered by some scholars 
as evils that cause celestial retributions in kind. Here are some 
expressions: “do you not see that nothing apart from the most basic 
subsistence is left in the hands of Muslims? The rest is either stolen or seized 
by the European infidel tyrants or the dissemblers of Asia” (Nursi, Lemalar, 
1655: 169) “You should understand that what I mean are the good things 
that are civilization's virtues and its benefits for mankind. Not its iniquities 
and evils that idiots have imagined to be its virtues, and imitating them, 
devastated our possessions. Through civilization's iniquities prevailing over 
its benefits and its evils being preferred to its virtues, mankind has suffered 
two calamitous blows in the form of two world wars and overturning that 
sinful civilization men have been so utterly disgusted that they have smeared 
the face of the earth with blood” (Nursi, Hutbe-i Şamiye, 1950: 38). 
These examples have shown how effects of colonization in the history 
have reflected negatively in the minds of undeveloped nations. In 
order to cure such kind of resentments of underdeveloped or 
developing countries humanitarian institutions should take care of 
institutional development of poor nations.  
While colonization has decreased the capacity of poor nations it 
accelerated development of western countries. This process also 
contributed to institutional competency of western countries. 
Considering majority of international aid organizations are western 
dominated effectiveness of institutions at the humanitarian aid 
domain by which ecosystem of developed nations increase market 
share and hinder economic competition. 
The idea that difference in institutions and government polities 
largely depends on differences in income per capita across countries is 
shared both by many economists and social scientists. Since the 
determinants of institutions and attitude of governments towards 
economic progress is not widely accepted, it becomes difficult to 
isolate exogenous sources of variation in institutions to conjecture 
their effect on performance. It has been argued by Acemoglu 
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(Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, 2001) that differences in colonial 
experience of countries could be a source of exogenous differences in 
institutions.  
Institutions in many countries were shaped during colonization age, 
so that examining colonies is a natural experiment as delved by 
Easterly (Easterly, 2006). It is argued by Chang (Chang, 2002) that 
increased wealth of western countries may have created higher 
demands for capability and maturity of institutions. Geography and 
culture which include embodied knowledge as well as embracing 
innovations are also quite important for development of institutions. 
Acemoglu (Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, 2002) argued that 
institutional changes are not always welcome by some interest groups 
such as landlords, dictators who wish to hold the reins of power. This 
shows (Alesina, 1994: 360) a lack of democracy which flourishes 
institutions in a country. Even so, some cross-country regressions 
show that there is no effect of democracy on growth. Therefore, 
democracy cannot feed the poor and build a stable state that can be 
self-sufficient to national and local needs of people. But evidence 
showed (Dawson, 1998: 610) that having good institutions are a 
significant determinant for economic growth. Hence if international 
institutions are well organized and coordinated according to real 
needs of poor countries such as a resilient ecosystem then problems of 
stemming from failures of “feed the hungry” norm can be easily 
solved. 
(e) Problems Related to Methods of Aid and Attitude of Aid 
Recipients 
There are two reasons why aid doesn’t not sow its positive effects. 
One is inappropriateness of aid methodology and the other is the 
attitude of aid recipients. There are many research articles and official 
reports that emphasize the importance of organizational and strategic 
change in these areas. Organizations are failing in providing self-
reliance of poor nations and recipients tend to be dependent of 
continuous aid. However, as the problems persist, we found it 
appropriate to provide some comments from a subjective perspective 
such as religious obligations. It is a known fact that religions are 
important source of motivation for helping people in need and 
goodness of society. Furthermore, we have found that religion can 










underdeveloped nations. The wisdom can be taken, or objective 
research can be emboldened by these sources. 
For example, in the Islamic tradition, helping to poor are always 
appreciated and ordered as a good deed. Therefore, helping to poor 
and needy people is considered as a virtue of Islamic obligations. 
However, there are certain instances in the Prophets implementations 
that needs to be taken into consideration.  One day a poor man came 
from the Muslims of Medina to the Prophet, and he wanted 
something to eat. 
Allâh's messenger told him: 
"Is there no any assets in your house?" He asked. 
Companion: 
He said, "Yes." "We have a water tank and a coat some of which we have 
clothed, some of which we have covered." 
The Prophet said: 
"-Go and bring them to me!" He said. The man brought a water bottle 
with a sack. Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) took them away and said: 
"-He who want to buy?" He asked. 
One of the Companions said that they would give them a dirham. The 
Prophet: 
"Would you give more?" He said a few times, and another companion, 
who gave two dirhams bought them. Giving money to the poor 
companion: 
"Take a meal with a dirham of it to your family. Bring me an ax purchasing 
with the remaining money!" He said. 
To the ax that the man brought, the Prophet took a wooden handle 
with his own hand and said to him: 
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"- go now; Cut the wood with it and sell it in the market! Work for fifteen 
days; come after it! " 
The poor man came fifteen days later. He earned ten Dirhems, bought 
clothes and food for himself and his family with this money. 
Our Prophet was very happy and said: 
"If you want that your begging does not look like a stain on the Day of 
Judgment, it is better for you to earn yourself rather than leaning on others." 
(Paksu, 2006) 
This anecdote is a very important example of treating poor people. 
There are many instances when some hungry people ask for food he 
would give what he had in hand available. If self-reliance of poor 
nations is not provided and attitude of aid recipients is not changed, 
then the coordination of aid will remain unresolved as a persistent 
chronic problem of international humanitarian aid organizations.  
CONCLUSION  
It is clearly the case that donors should be willing to take some risk in 
the aid processes and possibly to coordinate their activities to manage 
these risks. It is not desirable for donors to hold back on the 
implementation of reforms because they are risky, if one is convinced 
that they lead to better outcomes for the recipients in the long run. It 
should be possible to admit that interventions have failed, but 
according to the current perception one risks undermining aid 
support if one admits failure. As argued by Bigsten, Tengstam, there 
is a need for a more serious management of risks, and it should 
involve recipient governments as well. 
Aid coordination is a very desirable objective, because it can reduce 
the costs of delivering and monitoring aid (the transaction cost effect) 
and improve the targeting of the poor (the governance effect). The 
latter effect is achieved through more effective disciplining of the 
central or local governments and agencies in the host countries. In 
practice, however, too little of such aid coordination is observed. Even 
when the problem of aid coordination is seen as a “pure” coordination 










of fact, donor countries may fail to coordinate because, in the absence 
of a centralized decision-mechanism, they do not expect that other 
countries, or enough other countries, will join the coordinating group. 
Second, serious problems of free riding need to be overcome. Third, 
donor countries may take political costs seriously into account when 
they decide about the level or intensity of aid coordination efforts they 
want to apply. According to Bourguignon, Platteau (2015) a trade-off 
is thereby created between costs and benefits of coordination and the 
equilibrium level of coordination that donor countries want is far 
from optimal from the standpoint of aid targeting and aid outreach. 
To sum up the international aid organizations and donors should: 
1. Focus on local capacity development and contribution to local 
market resilience and sustainable national ecosystem for self-
reliance in the long term. 
2. Stop providing in kind assistance but rather direct financial 
support that can be infused as new demand for local products and 
services. 
3. Use a collective or shared frameworks and systems in collaboration 
that will inevitable decrease transaction costs and increase 
efficiency and effectiveness of aid allocation and distribution.  
4. Encourage usage of local and national resources and mobilization 
of internal dynamics to be resilient against unexpected events and 
disasters.  
5. Support business ventures and economic infrastructure that can 
handle needs at the local and national levels. 
6. Give money to the needy people rather than giving food in order 
to stir local and national market or provide job opportunities in 
line with requirements of local potentialities and regional 
dynamics. 
7. Implement joint activities focused on field application of 
humanitarian standards, knowledge-sharing, operational 
contextualization, and advocacy with emerging humanitarian 
standards initiatives in order to ease coordination of aid. 
8. Convene and progressively formalize a global alliance of 
humanitarian standards initiatives to increase impact of aid 
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programs and provide for cross-sectoral learning and joint services 
to practitioners.   
9. Improve and further develop consistent standards models and 
approaches in order to continue building greater coherence and 
compatibility amongst humanitarian aid donors, agencies and 
standards.    
10. Track humanitarian programs, projects and actions to identify 
trends and gaps where the development of new collaborations and 
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Dünya çapında yüzlerce farklı ajans insani yardım alanında çalışıyor. İnsani 
faaliyetlerin koordinasyonu zaman alıcı ve bazen de zor bir süreçtir. 
Organizasyonlar farklı, ara sıra çelişen görevlere sahiptir. Yaklaşım, 
perspektif ve önceliklerdeki değişimler insani toplumun çeşitliliğini 
yansıtması bakımından kaçınılmazdır. Bu çalışmada, katılımcı ülkelerde 
koordinasyon eksikliği, uygunsuz bilgi, gizli ajandalar, dijital uçurum, uygun 
olmayan para kullanımı ve kötü yönetimin açlık ve yetersiz beslenmeyle 
mücadelede etkili bir şekilde kullanılmasının önündeki temel engeller olduğu 
tespit edilmiştir. Kapsamlı bir literatür taraması yapılarak, yardım 
kuruluşlarının yönetimi ve yönetiminin daha iyi anlaşılması için tartışmaları 
ve ana bulguları gözden geçirilmiştir. Dünya çapında artık neredeyse her 
gelişmiş ulus kendi yardım kuruluşlarına sahiptir. Yardımın koordinasyonu 
normalde çok istenen ve dile getirilen bir amaçtır. Çünkü etkin koordinasyon, 
yardımın teslim edilmesi ve izlenmesi (işlem maliyet etkisi) maliyetlerini 
azaltabilir ve yoksulların (yönetişim etkisi) sorunlarının hedeflenmesi 
süreçlerini iyileştirebilir. Bu son etki, ev sahibi ülkelerdeki merkezi veya yerel 
yönetimlerin ve ajansların daha etkili bir şekilde disipline edilmesiyle elde 
edilebilmektedir. 
Bağış yapan ülkeler, genellikle yardımlarının sonuçlarından dolaylı olarak bir 
şeyler istiyorlar. Şüphesiz, yardım sağlamak için kendine has nedenleri 
vardır; bir ülkenin kaynaklarına erişim kazanmak, alıcıyı bağışçının nüfuz 
alanına çekmek ve bağışçıların rejim değişikliğinin peşinden koşması ve 
diğerlerinin yanı sıra siyasi muhalefeti etkilemek ve desteklemek gibi pek çok 
özel nedenler de bulunabilmektedir. Bağışçı ülkeler için, yardım 
koordinasyonunun ana eksikliği ulusal egemenliğin kaybedilmesi ve yardım 
programlarıyla ulusal hedeflerin takip edilmesinin engellenmesidir. Alıcı 
ülkeler için bu durum daha çok bağımsızlıklarının azalması olarak 
görülmektedir. Hem bağışçıların hem de alıcıların siyasi maliyetlerinin 
mevcudiyetinden doğan kaçınılmaz ticari kararları ışığında yardım 
koordinasyonunu destekleyen argümanların bir kısmının açıklığa 
kavuşturulması gerekmektedir. 
Bu çalışmada, uluslararası yardım alanında literatürün kısa bir özeti ve 
değerlendirmesi çıkarılmaya çalışılmıştır. Hem teorik hem de kavramsal 
yaklaşımların çözümünde bağışçılar ve yardım kuruluşları arasında 
koordinasyonu engelleyen sorunlar analiz edilerek incelenmiştir. Temel 
argümanlardan birisi, koordinasyon eksikliğinin sadece alıcı ülkedeki pazar 
esnekliğini bozmakla kalmayıp, aynı zamanda onları daha fazla ve daha fazla 
bağımlı hale getiren ekosistem ve yatırım ortamını da olumsuz yönde 
engellemesidir. Bağışçı ve fon veren kurumların paydaşlarının, başkalarıyla 
koordinasyonun öncelikli olmadığı ancak, kendi özel gündemleri de olduğu 
sonucuna varılmıştır. 
